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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I compare the positions of two iconoclasts on the brink of death,
Antigone in Sophocles’ Antigone and Socrates in Plato’s Apology, as well as their motivations
for addressing the public while facing execution, examining controversial lines from both
works. First I assay Antigone’s final lament, focusing on her statement that she would not
bestow the same burial honors on a husband or child as she did for her brother (lines 967970). This is followed by an analysis of Socrates’ defense speech, focusing on his claim to be
the wisest human living (23b). I study the contexts of age, honor, political astuteness, and
the direct conflict between interests of the State and those of the individual, and I inspect
the type and level of impact these have on the aforementioned speeches. I speculate that
the human fear of death causes both Antigone and Socrates to temporarily put aside
personal motivations and assume the interests of the State in order to sway their respective
audiences. Finally, I show that the unflattering portraits Antigone and Socrates create of
themselves are not the result of personal flaws but rather their inexperience with public
appeal and their ultimate inability, amidst fear, to move the common people.
At Death’s Door: Unsuccessful Political Entreaties in Antigone and The Apology
The lead characters in Plato’s Apology and Sophocles’ Antigone both draw a good bit
of controversy: Socrates with his self-effacement in regaling his jury with the story of his
gradual discovery that none was wiser than he in 23b, and Antigone with her infamous
admission that she would care more about the honor of a brother than a husband or son in
lines 967-970. Both Socrates and Antigone face the injustices thrown at them head on,
alone in their heroic rightness against others who misunderstand and fear them. However,
few would deny that both characters come off as unsympathetic during the aforementioned
portions of these respective works. Many scholars have been quick to criticize their
conduct, taking their troublesome words at face value. This paper intends a different
approach, asserting that Socrates’ defense speech and Antigone’s last lament 1) prioritize
public acceptance over sincerity and 2) fail from poor understanding of public address; the
characters’ sudden unsympathetic demeanor stems from poor self-representation rather
than actual flaw of character. I shall first compare their approaches, and then I will show
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how fear contributed to their contentious word choices that have alienated audiences for
centuries.
First, it should be noted that Socrates operates as a character in The Apology and will
be discussed as such. While it is widely agreed that Socrates was an actual historical figure,
modern readers know him solely through written accounts of his dialogues—most
famously those of Plato, his student. Because this paper cites a depiction of Socrates in a
single philosophical/literary work, Socrates will be referred to as a character hereinafter.
Next,

the

well-known

terms

oikos

(family/domestic

sphere)

and

polis

(political/public sphere) are introduced to highlight Antigone’s presence in both arenas. As
a woman in Ancient Greece, she acts from the oikos and is mainly preoccupied with it (Segal
14), given her priority of proper family burial over obedience of the law. However, certain
elements of Antigone’s final lament mark her as an occupant of the polis, as well.
For all of their similarities, Antigone and Socrates bear several differences in
Sophocles’ and Plato’s portrayals of them. The most striking difference is age. Antigone and
Socrates come from very different stages of their lives, with Antigone being very young and
Socrates being very old. “For me it’s noble to do/This thing, then die” she states coolly to
Ismene in lines 87-88 (Sophocles 56). The driving force for her actions is honor, which is
generally perceived as a mature quality. It is Antigone who decides to take matters in her
own hands to ensure that her brother Polyneikes is buried and family honor upheld—even
over the protests of her sister Ismene.
Yet certain remnants of Antigone’s youth cling to her despite overall maturity.
Antigone is sixteen years old or around that age (Sophocles 52), and she is prideful. She
demands that Ismene tell people that she is burying Polyneikes (illegally), disregarding the
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risk that this poses to her. And as soon as Ismene fails to support her actions, Antigone is
done with her. “If you say that [burying Polyneikes is impossible], you will be hated by me,”
she says in line 110 (57). When Ismene, much later in the play, comes to Antigone’s side and
claims partial responsibility for the burial, Antigone is not receptive. “I don’t like a loved
one who only loves with words,” she says in line 594 (77). Later on she seems to warm up
to her sister’s presence, even telling her “Save yourself! I won’t resent your escaping,” in
line 604 (78), but she still remains distant. In the most flattering reading, this is to protect
Ismene from punishment at the hands of the law. There also remains the possibility that
Antigone was trying to protect her the whole time, that she only pretended anger to try to
convince Ismene to go away. However, the vehemence with which Antigone demanded her
actions be known to the public can hardly be ignored. Most likely, Antigone’s motives are
mixed: As creator of the tragic persona (Knox 3) Sophocles produced protagonists who are
inextricably human, showing great capacity for caring for the right and wrong kinds of
things… often simultaneously. This is due in no small part to their intense isolation, forced
to act “in a terrifying vacuum, a present which has no future to comfort and no past to
guide, an isolation in time and space which imposes on the hero the full responsibility for
his own actions and its consequences” (5).
This manifests just as clearly in Antigone as in Sophocles’ other tragedies. Clearly
Antigone is distant in this second scene with Ismene. Her aloofness could be attributed to
her pride, it could be attributed to a desire to protect her sister, or it could be attributed to
both. In any case, if Antigone is distant to a family member about whom she likely cares
more than a mass of strangers, it follows that she might be as distant (if not more) so in her
last lament. The truth of her words therein is ambiguous at best. When she says that she

4
would not do for her husband or son what she did for her brother. Here Antigone is facing
certain execution, which gives her at least one extra reason for saying this (if, like most
humans, she has an aversion to death). Therefore, lines 967-970 should not necessarily be
read as a true reflection of her motives.
Age comprises the main tension between protagonist and antagonist in Antigone,
with Creon’s ageist refusal to listen to Antigone or even Haimon, his son, simply because
they are young. Therefore, age plays a notable role in the way the characters view not only
each other, but themselves, within the work—with particular scrutiny over youth. Antigone
is mature enough to know the full weight of honor, but she is also youthful enough to make
the decision to rebel against the law to uphold her brother’s honor, despite having no
problems with the law otherwise (Sophocles 73). Creon, despite being the eldest of himself,
Haimon, and Antigone, is the most prideful and least reasonable character, even called
childish by his own son (85).
Age also turns up in The Apology as a major theme, with Socrates on trial for
corrupting the youth. Coincidentally enough, Antigone is the poster child of corrupted
youth—albeit self-corrupted—at least in the eyes of her elders. Socrates, similarly derided
by elders (his contemporaries), is on trial because his fellow citizens see him as being an
enabler of rebels. This alarmist accusation, attributing the promotion of godlessness and
myriad other “false” ideas to Socrates (Plato 25), is a manifestation of Creon’s sentiment:
“There is no greater evil than lack of rule./This is what brings cities to ruin, it’s this/That
tears the household from its roots, it’s this/That routs the broken ranks of allied spears!”
(Sophocles 83). Just as Creon fears that Antigone’s actions will create chaos in the polis, the
Athenians fear that Socrates’ actions will create chaos in young people’s minds that will
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lead to turmoil in the polis. Socrates is not young himself at this point, but he, like Antigone,
must deal with the common people’s expectations regarding how the youth are to be
treated—essentially, what they are allowed to do and what they should and shouldn’t be
told. In much the same way, Antigone is punished harshly in accordance to Creon’s idea of
how rebellious youth should be dealt with. His polarizing stubbornness is more in line with
how a child would respond, as Haimon points out during their argument.
Yet Creon is not the only character in Antigone to act childishly. Haimon and
Antigone are the most mature characters in the play, although this doesn’t stop them from
exhibiting flashes of teenage/young adult tendencies that closer reflect their ages. Haimon,
although levelheaded enough to begin with, kills himself over Antigone in a fit of passion.
Antigone, as mentioned, is prideful and stubborn and listens to herself at the exclusion of
all others. Antigone’s youth is apparent throughout the play, and it lends her character a
vulnerability that is more pronounced than it would be in an older character. When her
vulnerability is considered alongside her dire circumstances, it is entirely plausible for her
to lose her composure and say something—anything—she feels could save her. For that
reason, it seems reasonable for Antigone to waver at the moment when everything she
prepared for comes to fruition. This could be expected from any human being. From one so
young, it could be expected tenfold.
As Antigone is being led out to her death, she is not completely calm. She notes with
despair “Ah, I am laughed at!” in line 897 (Sophocles 91). Her whole speech at that point
lacks focus—she leaves the present to launch into a story about someone who died at
Mount Sipylos in line 883-93 (90-91) and thence recalls “my mother’s disaster/of a
marriage bed” in lines 921-22 (93), then begins to lament “Oh tomb! Oh bridal
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bedchamber!” in line 951 (94), and from there says, to many readers’ chagrin: “I would
never have assumed this burden,/Defying the citizens, if it had been/My children or my
husband who had died/And had been left to rot away out there” (95). Thereafter she
wavers in her faith in her actions, wondering if she still has the support of the gods—“And
why/Should I, in my misfortune, keep looking to/The gods for help? To whom should I call
out/To fight as my ally, when my reverence has earned me charges of irreverence?” she asks
herself in lines 987-91 (95), lonely in her fate and stance. This is not the same confident
Antigone who said, at the very beginning, “For me it’s noble to do/This thing, then die.” The
gravity of death has finally hit her, now that she is being led to it. Her fear and realization
bleed from the page. And the meaning behind these final words has been debated for
centuries.
Again, while Socrates doesn’t share Antigone’s youth, he does share the state of
being othered by the elders in his community. He similarly puts forward some unpopular—
and even disturbing, judging by the reactions they generate—notions in The Apology. After
Socrates shares the self-aggrandizing story of the Delphi oracle in 21a-23b, he seems to
notice that his defense speech is not very well received. He has already had to tell the jury
several times not to cause a disturbance over his story in 20e-21a (Plato 20-21). Before he
tried to appeal to logic; now he attempts an emotional approach. He states that he will not
bring his family to the trial to evoke sympathy, but he does draw attention to the fact he has
family simply by stating it in 34d (31), performing a variation of the act he insists he will
not do by bringing the idea of his family to the trial. This is later in the dialogue, after
Socrates is well aware of the jury’s opinion of him from their unfavorable reactions. Again
he has to tell them not to make a disturbance in 30c (28). Although Socrates claims that he
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does not fear death in 29b (27), his behavior here reeks of desperation, the plea of one
being unjustly persecuted. Indeed, these entreaties come shortly before he is convicted. He
is an old man, he notes after the jury votes to sentence him to death in 38 c-d, close to the
end of his life. This may be another appeal to the emotions of his audience. It may also be a
personal manifestation of bitterness or disappointment, since there is now nothing he can
do to save himself from being sentenced. Likely it also factors in that his life’s work, his
elenchus, has failed to save him.
Yet in a more quietly devastating way, this outcome does not surprise him in 35e
(Plato 32). Socrates’ first statement is that he is no speechmaker in 17d-18 (18-19). As
always, he aims to tell the truth to the jury. And in telling the truth (as he sees it), Socrates
digs himself further into trouble. In particular, his truth of being the wisest alienates the
jury members and enables them to read Socrates’ words as being inspired by false modesty
and arrogance. There is a sense of disconnect between him and the jury convicting him, the
same sense of disconnect permeating the eyes of many modern readers of The Apology who
also see arrogance. Although Socrates is sincere, he comes across as insincere to the
outraged jury. More than anything else he manages to present himself in a very unflattering
light because he does not know how to communicate with the jury in a manner with which
they are familiar, by his own admission.
Both works read remarkably well under dual disciplines, given the tragic elements
Plato wove into The Apology and the depth of societal study and rhetoric Sophocles offered
in Antigone; philosophical and literary elements turn up often in both. For example, despite
the shortcomings in his defense speech, Socrates is clearly the wronged figure in The
Apology as one falsely put to death, “[resembling] a tragic hero on the model of Oedipus”
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(Howland 520). Many tragedy elements are present in The Apology, making it read very
naturally like a tragedy. In particular, the final choruses of Greek tragedies often mention
the gods. Plato does so near the end of the dialogue, writing that “a good man cannot be
harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods” in 41d
(Plato 36). Antigone, of course, stated something quite similar near her death, that if she
was right, the gods would be on her side.
Antigone, too, is sentenced to death, and there is a very similar sense of disconnect
between her and Creon and the law-abiding public. No one buried Polyneikes alongside her,
after all. Only Haimon seemed to understand and support her, even though he didn’t
actually help her. (And, given his impassioned suicide later on, it could easily be argued that
he cared blindly for Antigone without regard to her cause.) So Antigone, again, is
completely alone in her fate. Her odd, callous-sounding admission in lines 967-970 runs
parallel to Socrates’ various blunders that resulted in him further alienating himself. One
interpretation of the play by Martin Cropp quite astutely starts by pointing out that it’s
useful to think of Antigone’s final lament as being to the people, since she is being led
through throngs of people en route to her death. This obviously influences the way she is
speaking and the purpose behind her words. As Cropp points out, “[...]the whole speech is
shaped rhetorically as a public address. Antigone is stating a position, not merely
pondering her fate” (Cropp 139), similar to Socrates’ carefully-assembled defense speech.
Her appeal, as with Socrates’, mixes approaches. Her logical appeal lies in her claim: “Were
my husband dead, there could be another,/And by that man, another child, if one/Were lost.
But since my mother and my father/Are hidden now in Hades, no more brothers/Could
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ever be born” in lines 972-6 (Sophocles 95). This statement is explored further in the
following paragraph.
The inclusion of societal rhetoric is intrinsic to any public address as such, unless
the speaker doesn’t care about the outcome or make any attempt to identify with
audiences. Since both Antigone and Socrates are facing death, it follows that they do care
about the outcome and, therefore, do attempt to identify with audiences however much
they bungle things in the process. For the whole play, Antigone has been fighting the “the
public law of the State and the instinctive family-love and duty towards a brother” (Segal 3):
in other words, the tendency of Greek law to value the individual citizen mostly insofar as
(s)he contributed to society through the creation of a family, participating in wars, etc.
Creon, and the polis, would have Antigone obey the law and forbear from burying
Polyneikes because he was seen as a traitor to the State (7). Antigone, instead, follows her
individual interests and the interests of family honor—a quality with which the polis is not
all too concerned, except perhaps where that honor is of use to the polis through military
valor or the like. This is what makes Antigone’s deviance in 967-970 so jarring: by
identifying a husband and son as replaceable, as she immediately proceeds to do in lines
972-6, she is reflecting the disposition of the polis. For her to limit her interest to a single
type of family member and so clearly articulate polis interests is disturbing and inconsistent
with her previous concerns.
However, there are many reasons for Antigone to do so. No doubt contributing is the
fact that she has neither married nor given birth, relegating a husband and son to distant
ideas rather than concrete identities such as Polyneikes (a brother she actually knew and
loved) embodied. As a child herself, Antigone would find it difficult or impossible to
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conceive of caring for figures who do not yet exist in her life—and anticipate doing the
same for them as she did for Polyneikes. And because lines 972-6 stick out so sorely, they
seems more “positional,” to borrow Cropp’s words, than anything else in the lament. Other
interpretations have picked up on this and speculated that it is death, becoming the wife of
Hades (Segal 28), that causes Antigone’s thoughts to turn from the family to the polis—and
to husbands and sons as contributions to the polis (Papadopoulou 154). Antigone discusses
death and marriage in her final lament. However, she returns to the present situation to
note that she is laughed at and to wonder about her standing with the gods. Given this, and
given the interpretation of this lament as a public address, it might seem also that life is her
prime motivation for these words. This doesn’t necessarily indicate that Antigone wants to
live, but at the very least she realizes finally that she is going to die. Perhaps she wishes for
a few good things to improve the quality of the last few minutes of life she has: she wants
sympathy or understanding, a bit of time wherein she is not alone before she is dead. And
so when Antigone turns to the interests of the polis, it may sensibly read as an attempt to
get sympathy from bystanders—who are still likely jittery from Polyneikes’ attempted
invasion of Thebes (Sophocles 127). Again, Antigone is alone in her actions and fate, and
her stoic faith in her actions wavers when she questions the utility in continuing to turn to
the gods for help.
This wavering proves contagious, not limited to youth. Even as a seventy-year-old
man (Plato 19), Socrates shows signs of weakness and fear in The Apology. To assume that
Antigone never vacillates between self-assuredness and vulnerability as a teenage girl, after
being twisted along a similar fate, is grossly unrealistic, especially with her more childish
stubbornness and pride displayed so prominently in the narrative. Audiences
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overwhelmingly find Antigone sympathetic, and therefore glossing over the problematic
section of 967-970 becomes a palatable option for many. But this is not prudent, not when
it can provide valuable insight about her character and humanity. Sophocles may well have
created a martyr in Antigone, but even more than that he created a victim, a realistically
scared teenage girl.
There are inherent similarities between the plights of Antigone and Socrates in
Antigone and The Apology. Both are accused of breaking the law—Antigone for burying
Polyneikes against the King’s orders, which she did, and Socrates for corrupting the youth,
which he didn’t—and both are sentenced to death for it. Both otherwise sympathetic rebels
come off as unsympathetic in portions of the literature. However, these are wise, stately
heroes whose less sympathetic moments bring nuance to their characters. Socrates and
Antigone, in facing some horrible odds, became apprehensive and employed ineffective
communicative methods in their entreaties for help and sympathy. With this
understanding, their humanity glimmers from the page. Such characters, even at the
threshold of death, have never looked more alive.
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